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Abstract— Wi-Fi networks have become prevalent in homes, 
businesses, and public places. Wi-Fi is one of the most common 
means that people use to access digital services like Facebook, 
WhatsApp, Instagram, email, and even payment platforms. 
Equipment for deploying Wi-Fi networks is affordable and its 
basic features are easy to manipulate. In many cases Wi-Fi users 
do not even have to buy any communication equipment, since Wi-
Fi routers are installed by internet service providers (ISP) in the 
premises of their customers. Wi-Fi equipment, owned either by 
end users or ISP companies, should be configured as securely as 
possible to avoid potential attacks. The security capabilities and 
features of Wi-Fi routers and access points are inserted into 
beacon and probe response frames. Potential attackers can use 
sniffing tools like Wireshark to capture these frames and extract 
information about security features to discover vulnerabilities.  In 
order to assess the security risks of Wi-Fi networks we conducted 
a survey in which we used Wireshark to capture the traffic from 
several Wi-Fi networks, and then through a filter we selected the 
beacon and probe response frames to analyze the security 
information elements carried by those frames. We came to the 
conclusion that despite technical recommendations, some security 
parameters and options are still set in a way that makes networks 
more prone to attacks. With this paper we want the readers to be 
aware of the security risks of their Wi-Fi networks, even the ones 
set up by their internet service providers.    
 
Index Terms— Beacon frames, IEEE802.11, RSN, Security, TKIP, 
Wi-Fi, Wireshark, WPS. 
 
 
Resumen— Las redes Wi-Fi se han vuelto prevalentes en hogares, 
empresas y lugares públicos. Wi-Fi es uno de los medios más 
comunes que las personas usan para acceder a servicios digitales 
como Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, correo electrónico e 
incluso plataformas de pago. El equipo para implementar redes 
Wi-Fi es asequible y sus características básicas son fáciles de 
manipular. En muchos casos, los usuarios de Wi-Fi ni siquiera 
tienen que comprar un equipo de comunicación, ya que los 
enrutadores de Wi-Fi son instalados por los proveedores de 
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servicio de Internet (ISP) en las residencias de sus clientes. Los 
equipos de Wi-Fi, sean propiedad de los usuarios finales o de las 
empresas ISP, deben configurarse de la manera más segura 
posible para evitar posibles ataques. Las capacidades y 
características de seguridad de los enrutadores Wi-Fi y los puntos 
de acceso se insertan en las tramas beacon y probe request. Los 
posibles atacantes pueden usar herramientas de escaneo, como 
Wireshark, para capturar dichas tramas y extraer información 
sobre las características de seguridad para descubrir 
vulnerabilidades. Con el fin de evaluar los riesgos de seguridad de 
las redes Wi-Fi, se realizó un estudio en el cual se usó Wireshark 
para capturar el tráfico de varias redes Wi-Fi, y posteriormente a 
través de un filtro se seleccionaron las tramas beacon y probe 
response para analizar los elementos de información de seguridad 
llevados por esas tramas.  Se concluyó que a pesar de las 
recomendaciones técnicas algunos parámetros y opciones de 
seguridad están configurados de una manera que hace las redes 
más susceptibles a ataques. Con este artículo queremos que los 
lectores sean conscientes de los riesgos de seguridad de sus redes 
Wi-Fi, incluso las configuradas por sus proveedores de servicio de 
internet.   
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i-Fi networks have become prevalent in homes, work 
places, malls, and other public places. Wi-Fi is currently 
the most common and accessible way to share internet 
connections. The increase in the number of smart phones and 
other wireless devices has motivated the deployment of Wi-Fi 
networks.  Wi-Fi networks play an important role in the digital 
life of many people that rely on Wi-Fi connections due to their 
low cost. This low cost comes with the high cost of risking 
sensible data when the networks are set without taking into 
consideration technical recommendations.   
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Wi-Fi routers are affordable and some users do not even have 
to purchase one because their internet providers install them as 
part of their service. It is a common practice that the only 
configuration parameters modified on the Wi-Fi routers, at the 
time of installation and during their operative life, are the name 
of the network, technically known as SSID (Service Set 
Identifier), and the password, leaving the other parameters 
untouched.  Using the factory default configuration ignoring 
security parameters might open the door to attackers, which 
with little effort and free tools can get access to the Wi-Fi 
networks. Our survey demonstrates that security 
recommendations issued by reputable organizations, such as the 
Wi-Fi alliance and the United States Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team (US-CERT) are neglected in a high percentage 
of Wi-Fi networks.  
This paper is organized as follows: We start by giving a brief 
overview of Wi-Fi security, its beginnings, evolution, and the 
last significant update, WPA3. Then, we explain how 
information security is embedded in beacon and probe response 
frames. In the next section, we explain the security risks made 
visible by the WPS (Wi-Fi Protected Setup), RSN (Robust 
Security Network), and WPA (Wireless Protected Access) 
information elements. In the next section, we present a real-life 
survey where we captured Wi-Fi traffic from different networks 
at different locations in Villavicencio, Meta, Colombia; we 
explain how we extracted the data from the aforementioned 
information elements. Following the presentation of the survey, 
we present and discuss the results explaining the security risks 
and how to mitigate them. Finally, we make conclusions.      
 
II. WI-FI SECURITY OVERVIEW 
 
    The security of Wi-Fi networks can be seen as pre-RSN 
(Robust Security Network) and RSN. RSN is specified by 
means of the IEEE 802.11i amendment issued in 2004.  Before 
IEEE802.11i the options to offer confidentiality were reduced 
to WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) and the authentication was 
either open or by means of a shared key. These security methods 
were soon broken, forcing the    Wi-Fi-alliance to come up with 
the IEEE 802.11i amendment. IEEE 802.11i established the 
RSN age of Wi-Fi networks introducing several methods for 
authentication, confidentiality, data integrity, key management, 
and access control as shown in Fig. 1 [1].  
 
Fig. 1 Taxonomy of Wi-Fi security [1]. 
 
The RSN methods shown in Fig. 1 are better known as WPA 
(Wireless protected access) and WPA2, each one having two 
levels: personal and enterprise.  WPA and WPA2 personal are 
intended for use in SOHO (Small Office Home Office) and 
home networks, whereas WPA and WPA2 enterprise are for 
medium and large-scale networks.  The main difference 
between the personal and enterprise levels lies in the 
authentication method: The personal level uses pre-shared key 
authentication (PSK), whereas the enterprise one uses 
IEEE802.1X authentication.  RSNs are established through 
RSN associations (RSNAs), security relationships based on the 
IEEE802.11i 4-way handshake that allows for the protection 
data frames and enhanced security. Security features enabled by 
RSNs are: enhanced user authentication mechanisms, 
cryptographic key management, data source authentication and 
integrity, data confidentiality, protection against replay. Pre-
RSN networks, like WEP, used only one key or a small number 
of keys for all the devices, and lacked a standard mechanism to 
distribute keys. RSN introduced two key hierarchies: the 
pairwise key hierarchy for protecting unicast traffic, and the 
group key hierarchy for protecting broadcast and multicast 
traffic. The keys are for securing the traffic through three 
services: encryption, authentication, and integrity.  
IEEE802.11i defines that pairwise keys can be installed through 
two mechanisms:  
 
Pre- Shared Key (PSK): A PSK is a static key given to the 
access point (authentication server -AS) and the stations (STA) 
through a secure mechanism. The PSK should be loaded into 
the devices before the association stage. The IEEE standard 
does not specify how to generate or distribute the PSK; 
therefore, organizations should review their PSK 
implementation to detect vulnerabilities. For big organizations 
the PSK distribution might be infeasible. 
 
Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting Key (AAAK): 
Also known as a Master Session Key (MSK), the AAAK is 
loaded into the AP during the RSNA establishment by means 
of an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP). The AAAK 
changes each time a user starts a session, authenticates to the 
WLAN and lasts until the key lifetime expires or the user re-
authenticates.   EAP operates directly over data link layers, such 
as IEEE802.3 and IEEE802.11 [2].  IEEE802.11i defines three 
components: the supplicant, the authenticator, and the 
authentication server (AS). The supplicant is a piece of software 
run by the clients wanting to associate with the access point. 
The authenticator is the access point. The authentication server 
contains and validates the authentication information. EAP 
passes authentication information between the supplicant and 
the AS. The authenticator, the access point, is an intermediary 
between the supplicant and the AS [3].     
 
An improvement to IEEE802.11i, is WPA3. WPA3 introduced 
in 2018 uses the most advanced cryptographic methods [4]. 
WPA3 is compatible with WPA2, disallows outdated legacy 
protocols, such as WEP and TKIP, and mandates the use of 
protected management frames (PMF). PMF, optional in WPA2, 
prevents attacks that use disassociation and de-authentication 
frames, explained later in this paper.  Currently, WPA3 is 
optional for certified Wi-Fi devices, but when the market grows 
and consolidates, it will become mandatory. Like WPA2, 
WPA3 comes in two versions: WPA3-Personal and WPA3-
Enterprise.  
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WPA3-Personal uses Simultaneous Authentication of Equals 
(SAE), defined in the standard IEEE 802.11-2016 [5], instead 
of PSK used by WPA2-Personal.  SAE is robust against offline 
dictionary attacks where the adversary tries to steal network 
passwords by testing possible passwords without interacting 
with the network. This capability provides the users with more 
robust password-based authentication even when they use 
simple passwords; therefore, users can choose passwords easier 
to remember. Additionally, WPA3-Personal provides forward 
secrecy (FS); which means that data are protected even if a 
password is compromised after the data has been transmitted.  
With FS a unique session key is created each time a user stars a 
session; therefore, if a key is compromised, it will only affect 
the data exchanged using that particular key. 
 
WPA3-Enterprise builds upon WPA2 and introduces the 
following features: 256-bit Galois/Counter Mode Protocol 
(GCMP-256) for authenticated encryption; 384-bit Hashed 
Message Authentication Mode (HMAC) with Secure Hash 
Algorithm (HMAC-SHA384) for key derivation and 
confirmation;  Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) 
exchange and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
(ECDSA) using a 384-bit elliptic curve for key establishment 
and authentication; and 256-bit Broadcast/Multicast Integrity 
Protocol Galois Message Authentication Code (BIP-GMAC-
256) for robust management protection. WPA3-Enterprise also 
offers 192-bit, an optional feature more secure than the current 
128-bit encryption [6].   
 
III. SECURITY INFORMATION EMBEDDED IN WI-FI 
FRAMES 
Beacon and probe request frames contain security 
information that the wireless stations need to know prior to 
establishing RSN associations (RSNA) with the access points. 
One of the pieces of information contained in those frames is 
the RSN (Robust Secure Network) information element, 
RSNIE. Fig. 2 shows the RSNIE [5]. The element ID field, 
whose value is 48, differentiates the RSNIE from other 
elements contained in the frame.  The length indicates the 
number of bytes that come after it. The version indicates the 
version number. In an RSN several cipher suites are used. The 
field group data cipher suite indicates the encryption 
algorithms used to protect multi-cast data frames. The field 
pairwise cipher suite list tells which algorithms are used to 
protect unicast frames.  The field AKM (authentication key 
management) suite list indicates if the authentication method is 
either PSK or EAP.  The fields PMKID count and PMKID list 
only travel within association and re-association request 
frames.  PMKID is the unique key identifier used by the AP to 
keep track of the PMK (primary master key) being used for the 
client. Of special interest is the RSN capabilities field, which 
indicates the requested and advertised capabilities. This field 
indicates whether or not the access point requires and is capable 
of protecting management frames.  Other subfields of RSN 
capabilities have replay counters to prevent replay attacks to 
multi-cast and uni-cast frames. When the management frames 
are being protected, the field group management cipher suite 
indicates the cryptographic algorithms used to protect multi-
cast management frames; the unicast management frames are 





Fig. 2 RSN Information Element (RSNIE).         
                                          
Some beacon and probe response frames also have vendor 
specific elements.  These elements carry information not 
defined in the standard; they are organized in a format that helps 
to prevent interoperability issues. The format for this element is 
in Fig. 3.  One common vendor specific element is the 
Microsoft Corp. element type WPS, which indicates if WPS is 
enabled in the access point.  WPS (Wi-Fi Protected Access) is 
a method created by the Wi-Fi alliance to facilitate the 
connection to home networks to inexperienced users. Another 
vendor specific information element is the WPA information 
element from Microsoft, which repeats some of the fields 
carried by the RSNIE. 
 
 
Fig. 3 Vendor specific element 
 
IV. SECURITY RISKS 
The information provided by the RSNIE and some other vendor 
specific elements makes evident the risks under which Wi-Fi 
networks operate. Starting with the field RSN capabilities, if 
protection of management frames is not required, a door is open 
for de-authentication and disassociation attacks, which aim at 
disconnecting legal users by sending forged de-authentication 
and disassociation frames. With tools such as Scapy [7], it is 
possible to forge the aforementioned frames with the source 
MAC address equal to the BSSID (Basic Service Set ID), so 
that the client stations see the frames as legitimate and proceed 
according to the type of frame: de-authentication or 
disassociation. By default, management and control frames are 
not protected; therefore, it is not necessary for the attacker to 
know any password. Just with the BSSID and the MAC address 
of the client to be attacked, the attacker can forge the frames to 
make the target client disconnect from the AP.  BSSID and 
client MAC addresses are easily obtained by means of free tools 
like Wireshark [8].  These attacks are used not only for 
disconnecting users, but also to force them send authentication 
and association frames again, so they can be captured and 
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analyzed to extract passwords. 
 
The fields containing cipher suite information let the potential 
attackers know if the network uses TKIP encryption, AES 
encryption or both.  TKIP was an intermediate algorithm 
between WEP and WPA2 -AES.  TKIP was intended as a 
software update to improve the safety of 802.11 hardware 
operating with WEP.  Beck and Tews [9] in 2009 demonstrated 
that it is possible to inject frames with custom payload in a 
network protected with MIC (message integrity check), used by 
TKIP for integrity protection. AES, introduced through WPA2, 
required new hardware and promised to be at the moment a 
definitive solution to the vulnerabilities of TKIP; however, in 
2017 Vanhoef [10] discovered vulnerabilities in the WPA2 
standard itself and was able to decrypt frames from WPA2 
networks. Since those vulnerabilities belong to the standard, 
any WPA2 device is affected disregarding its configuration. To 
be protected against the KRACK attack, the devices must be 
patched [11].   
 
If WPS is enabled, there is another door open [12]. WPS uses a 
PIN as a mechanism to provide the client with connection 
information such as the WPA password. The client simply 
needs to provide the PIN number to gain access to the 
authentication credentials. Through freely available tools, such 
as Fern Wi-Fi Wireless Cracker [13] and Reaver [14], the WPS 
PIN can be obtained in 4 to 10 hours [12].    
 
Table I summarizes the security risks that potential attackers 
can discover through the information embedded in beacon and 
probe response frames; it also suggests the solutions to 
ameliorate or eliminate the risks.  
 
V. REAL LIFE SURVEY 
 
 We conducted a survey wherein we captured Wi-Fi traffic at 
different locations in the City of Villavicencio. The goal of the 
survey was to analyze the information embedded in beacon and 
probe response frames in order to discover security risks. To 
conduct the survey, we used Wireshark installed on an Ubuntu 
18.04 machine. We set the Wi-Fi interface to monitor mode, so 
we were able to capture all the details of the IEEE802.11 
frames. We captured Wi-Fi traffic from 150 access points at 
different places of Villavicencio.  We combined all the capture 
files into a single one for analysis purposes. The default 
Wireshark view has few columns such as source, destination, 
protocol, and info. To conduct the analysis, we added to the 
Wireshark view the necessary columns, Fig. 4.  After having all 
the necessary columns, we filtered the capture to visualize only 
the beacon and the probe response frames, we finally exported 
the results to a .csv file and did the data wrangling in Pandas.  
The whole process is illustrated in Fig. 5. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Wireshark columns used to conduct the survey. 
 
Fig. 5 Wi-Fi frame capture and analysis. 
 
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We summarized the results in the following pie charts. The 
survey tells us that although vulnerabilities of some Wi-Fi 
protocols and features have been reported, in many cases they 
are ignored and no corrections have been implemented.  We 
observed that WPS is still used in a significant percentage of 
the observed networks.  WPS vulnerabilities were reported back 
in 2011 [12]. Fig. 6 shows that WPS is enabled in 43.9% of the 
access points, disabled in 5.7%, and not supported in 50.4%. 
That means in half (50.4%) of the access points the 
manufacturers did not installed support for WPS; however, in 
the other half (43.9% plus 5.7%) that supports WPS, this 
TABLE I 
SAFETY RISKS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Attack 
Field of beacon frame 








Required: False  










































Disabling TKIP and using 
only CCMP(AES) 
KRACK attack None: since the attack 
takes advantage of a 
WPA2 weakness 
Patching the device 
   
a This column shows the fields of beacon frames and the values of these fields 
that facilitate attacks. This also applies to probe response frames. 
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protocol is enabled in most of the APs; 43.9% out of 49.6%, 
which is 88.5% of the APs that support WPS. This situation 
could be easily solved by accessing the administration web page 
of the AP and disabling WPS; however, in many cases access 
to the AP administration is blocked to the users, since the ISPs 
are the owners of these devices; therefore, they are the ones that 
should disable this functionality. According to our results, some 
internet providers are either unaware of the WPS vulnerability 
or just indifferent to it. 
 
 
Fig. 6 Wi-Fi Protected Setup Statistics 
 
Fig. 7 shows that 87.8% of the APs lack the management frames 
protection capability, whereas 5.7% of the APs have this 
capability.  6.5 % of the APs did not add the RSN information 
element to the frames; therefore, for these APs no information 
is available regarding the protection of management frames.  
 
Fig. 7 Management Protection Frame Capable Statistics. 
Fig. 8 shows that 93.5% of the APs do not require the protection 
of management frames. 5.7% of the APs have the PMF 
capability; however, none of them require the management 
frames to be protected; therefore, they accept protected and 
unprotected management frames. The consequence of setting 
PMF to required is that only PMF capable stations can associate 
to the AP. The RSNIE is missing in 6.5% of the frames; 
therefore, information about the PMF requirement is not 
available 
 
Fig. 8 Management Protection Frame Required Statistics 
 
Information about the pairwise and groupwise ciphers, and the 
authentication management keys is carried by the RSNIE or the 
WPA information element.  Depending on the AP, the beacon 
and probe response frames can carry both information elements, 
just one, or none.  In our study we found all these cases.  The 
beacon and probe response frames with WPA information 
element come from APs in transition to RSN.  If the frames 
have only RSNIE, the APs are IEEE802.11i complaint. If none 
of the aforementioned information elements are present, the 
APs probably are very old; that is the case for 4.1% of the Aps.   
Fig. 9 shows the percentages for the types of pairwise traffic 
ciphers. 45.5% of the APs use only AES, the recommended 
practice; however, 47.2% use both TKIP and AES, and 3.3% 
use only TKIP. Supporting TKIP is not a good practice, due to 
the vulnerabilities already reported; even the Wi-Fi Alliance on 
a technical note discouraged the use of TKIP in 2015 [15]. 
Although WPA2 has been broken recently, it is still safer than 
TKIP [16]. Let us not forget that TKIP was a temporary 
mechanism, introduced in 2004, to solve the vulnerabilities of 
WEP without changing the hardware; nowadays when the vast 
majority of hardware has been upgraded, it is surprising TKIP 
is still in use, ignoring the recommendation of the Wi-Fi 




Fig. 9 Pairwise Cipher Suite Statistics 
 
We have a similar situation with the groupwise ciphers: 50.4 % 









Management Protection Frame Capable
FALSE TRUE No Information
93.5%
6.5%







AES (CCM) TKIP and AES(CCM)
TKIP No Information
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Fig. 10 Groupwise Cipher Suites Statistics. 
 
Disabling TKIP can be done easily via the administration 
graphical interface of APs. As in the WPS case, the final users 
have no access to that interface. According to the Wi-Fi 
alliance’s 2015 technical note, already mentioned, TKIP should 
be disabled by default in Wi-Fi certified devices, and access to 
any TKIP option should not be available in the main 
administrative graphical interface, but only through a secondary 
interface in the case that access for legacy devices, only TKIP, 
is required; however, vendors, installers of Wi-Fi devices, and 
ISPs still enable TKIP.  
In our survey, PSK was the only authentication management 
key mechanism that we were able to observe: 95.9% of the APs 
use PSK, the other 4.1% don’t transmit RSNIE; therefore, they 
are not IEEE802.11i complaint, Fig. 11 
 
 
Fig. 11 Authentication Key Management Statistics.  
 
We have commented on known vulnerabilities and how to 
reduce the risk by doing simple changes to the configuration of 
access points and Wi-Fi routers. Unfortunately, none of these 
recommendations can prevent the KRACK attack, which takes 
advantage of IEEE802.11 standard flaws and is not preventable 
by changing the configuration of devices [10]. We can protect 
devices from the Krack by means of patches. A list with patches 
available for devices from several vendors is available in [17].  
Considering that the Wi-Fi Alliance will not enforce the use of 
WPA3 for certifying devices in the near future, WPA2 will still 
be present in our lives for some more years; therefore, it is 
necessary to protect our current WPA2 devices as much as 





    We have used Wireshark to capture Wi-Fi traffic at different 
locations in the city of Villavicencio in Colombia. We have 
focused our work on analyzing some information elements, 
carried by beacon and probe response frames, which contain 
data indicating security features and capabilities. In our analysis 
we found that a significant percentage of networks operate 
ignoring the latest recommendations and still use insecure 
protocols, whose vulnerabilities were reported around a decade 
ago. WPS is still broadly used putting in risk home networks; 
something that can be easily solved by just disabling the WPS 
option in access points and Wi-Fi routers. TKIP, whose use has 
been discouraged by the Wi-Fi Alliance, is still in use despite 
of the fact that AES, more robust cipher, is available in all the 
Wi-Fi devices manufactured and certified as of 2004. Although 
one technical reason for keeping TKIP is to allow legacy 
devices, pre-RSN, to connect to Wi-Fi networks, the good 
practice is to have separated networks for those legacy devices, 
where additional security measures are in place. What we 
observed is that TKIP and AES devices share the same 
networks making the latter vulnerable to the weaknesses of the 
former. As in the WPS case the solution is to disable TKIP 
through the web interface of the affected devices.  The 
protection of management frames is neither available nor 
enabled in most of the devices we observed. The solution to this 
security flaw could be a simple configuration task, but it also 
might imply a software or hardware update.  Protection against 
the KRACK attack implies patching the devices, when the 
patch is available, or buying new equipment. The internet 
service providers, who install Wi-Fi routers as part of their 
service, and internet subscribes that deploy their own Wi-Fi 
networks should be more aware of the risks that come with the 
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